A key factor in the development of anti-corruption legislation during the Czech opposition treaty period was the accession negotiations in Slovakia to join the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. However, the negotiations themselves took place against the backdrop of turbulent domestic political events, to which business also reacted. At the same time, the latter saw great opportunities and considerable potential behind joining the West and moving away from Mečiar’s course towards Moscow.
It was the pressure of business circles and their own economic interests that led to the unprecedented consensus of Mečiar’s people with the democratic part of the political spectrum. It was also reinforced by opinion polls showing that up to about 80 percent of Mečiar’s voters wanted to join the EU. However, in general, this was a sociological phenomenon, with the population deciding whether they wanted to continue with a democratic transition or lean towards an autocratic model. Thanks to this, the public opinion of Slovaks was clearly in favour of the transatlantic alliance.
The efforts of the third Mečiar government between 1994-1998 to bring Slovakia under Moscow’s influence were temporarily defeated as a result of the 1998 elections, when the democratic new breed of parties led by Mikuláš Dzurinda came to power (unfortunately, they are still returning in different mutations and with different faces). However, even the aura of Mikuláš Dzurinda did not remain untarnished for long. Already during the elections, information leaked that his movement had bribed several journalists to build a positive image of the incoming Slovak leader. However, everything was pushed to the margins of public interest, precisely under the pretext of brighter tomorrows and promised prosperity.
The simplification and narrowing of the public debate to whether citizens are for or against the EU has led to several negative phenomena. Disgust with Mečiar’s Dark Ages, accompanied by unprecedented corruption, criminality and a move towards autocracy, led the democratic part of society to overlook some of the imperfections of Slovakia’s accession transformation. Emphasising the benefits of EU membership has led to ignoring the de facto disregard for the accompanying institutional changes – for example, the missing or delayed introduction of European directives on anti-corruption, transparency and oversight into Slovak law. For the European Union, the integration of the Czech Republic and Slovakia was an absolutely crucial issue for the stabilisation of the Central European region. This is also why it has been conciliatory towards some of the shortcomings in the accession process and has tried to speed up the processes as much as possible.
The main motive for the accession negotiations in Slovakia was economic benefits – access to the free market or free movement of people and the promise of catching up with the economic and especially living standards of the West. In retrospect, a large part of the professional public in Slovakia describes the exaggeration of the economic benefits of EU accession as a big mistake. As with the fall of the Iron Curtain, Slovaks were not discussing what freedom meant in terms of values and human rights, but how much and when they would become rich.
On the other hand, however, there was an obvious effort to push for greater transparency of privatisation processes, which was not very much taken care of during Mečiar’s regime. Until 1997, official EU documents stated that Slovakia, despite its declared interest and efforts, was not eligible for practical accession processes. It was not until the accession of Mikulas Dzurinda that the EU received sufficient assurances that the Slovaks were serious about democratisation processes.
Either way, Slovakia, like the Czech Republic, has undergone key changes during the accession negotiations, culminating in a truly functioning market economy, the application of the foundations of liberal-democratic legislation and the creation of sufficient enforcement capacity in written law. Following a series of political changes, on 3 October 1999 the European Commission’s assessment was that Slovakia had met the political criteria and recommended the opening of accession talks.
In its evaluation report on Slovakia, the Commission wrote that the country “can be considered” a functioning market economy for the first time on 8 November 2000, but at the same time criticised the lack of reform of the judiciary and state administration. Already during the accession negotiations, when Brussels sent Bratislava its first euro funds, they were already being defrauded. This led to a temporary suspension of accession negotiations and further political upheaval. Aware of the importance of the processes, Dzurinda proceeded to a political purge and, after the resumption of accession negotiations, applied reform measures so quickly that he earned only superlatives from the European Commission, describing Slovakia as the future “tiger of Europe”. In a referendum on 16 and 17 May 2003, Slovaks confirmed their decision to join the EU. Their will was fulfilled in May a year later.
