The formation of the government in 2020 was accompanied by many expectations. The 2020 Government Programme Statement (adopted virtually unchanged by the renewed government of Eduard Heger) contained a number of beneficial measures. The introduction of a systematic legislative process and reduction of bureaucracy, strengthening of law enforcement coupled with the regulation of the evaluation of judges’ work and streamlining of the judiciary – all these were areas that governments of the previous decade had not addressed due to their passivity.
However, several crises have interfered with the practical implementation of governments’ post-2020 plans. The very early stages of translating the Government’s Programme Statement into real legislative proposals were slowed or delayed by the coronavirus pandemic. Then came the unprecedented security crisis triggered by Russia’s unleashing of war in Ukraine.
However, the government’s external problems must be compounded by its dysfunction, caused mainly by the incompetence of some of its members and political infighting. The very fact that the government was initially ruled by a constitutional majority clearly shows that the failure to implement reforms and promises is entirely the fault of the members of the cabinet themselves. While there was an explanation for the postponement of plans, there is no excuse for their cancellation.
However, there have been several improvements compared to the previous stagnation. For example, after a long period of time, an appeal to eliminate corruption was noticeable. Several steps have been taken to digitise the public administration, laws and strategic documents on reform options for the Ministry of Economy or points strengthening the competences of expert teams assessing key government projects.
This is also linked to the fulfilment of the public’s demand for the efficient and transparent use of EU funds. Within the framework of supporting infrastructure and climate-energy objectives as a priority for the use of EU funds, Slovakia has adjusted the selection of evaluators for projects supported by EU and state subsidies. Corruption scandals and problems in cases of fraudulently allocated agricultural subsidies have also been addressed over the years.
However, many of the government’s solutions have remained only in theory, for example in the form of a strategy document. The implementation phase in the form of an adopted functional law has often not taken place.
In the area of digitisation and changing the approach to the use of EU funds, the objectives set by the state institutions are not being achieved. These are often correctly defined in strategic documents, but in practical implementation the preference for more experienced applicants persists at the expense of better quality ones.
Positive trends were shown by the activity of the 2020-2023 governments in the areas of introducing a systematic legislative process and reducing bureaucracy. Unfortunately, some of these positives were negated by the government’s populist actions and disregard for the rules of parliamentary life or legislative processes, especially in the second half of 2022 and in 2023. Everything positive and reforming that the government adopted, it adopted in the first half of its mandate.
Toll Tender 2
Even more than a decade of unfavourable toll collection for the state in Slovakia has not brought change, and none of the governments of Robert Fico, Iveta Radičová or Peter Pellegrini has fundamentally improved the parameters of cooperation with the system supplier.
Change after 2020 was promised by the government of Igor Matovič, followed by the almost identical cabinet of Eduard Heger. Although the reconstruction of the toll collection mechanism was clearly emphasised rhetorically, the cabinet that succeeded the Smer-SD governments also faced strong lobbying pressures. These were allegedly triggered, among other things, by the fact that the transport ministry was taken over after the elections by Boris Kollár and his Sme rodina movement, where many members were linked to business and former structures. This led to unclear delays and non-transparent processes within the ministry.
The main problem with the toll system under the Tatras is the fact that the whole system, from the technical infrastructure to the software, was in the hands of a private contractor. All investments were covered by the state and European funds. At the end of 2022, the motorway company resigned to resolve this situation and negotiate with a private contractor. It exercised an option to extend the operating mechanism of the system for another year.
In the meantime, analyses and tests open to other contractors were launched to demonstrate that they could build a more profitable operating system for the state. The SAO has criticized the state for not having a clear answer on how toll collection will proceed. It also pointed out that the state had failed to take advantage of several contractual options to secure tolls for the next five years and also to reduce the proportion of commission paid to SkyToll.
According to an analysis by the National Audit Office, the toll system’s operating revenue for the period 2010 to 2021 amounted to €2.25 billion excluding VAT, more than half of which was absorbed by the costs of setting up and then operating the system. The motorway company collected only 36-39 percent of the tolls collected. The motorway authority eventually prepared a new tender for the new toll. However, according to anti-corruption organisations and the Audit Office, the conditions of the tender were again prepared to the disadvantage of the state and discriminated against some of the bidders.
The result of the tender, which admitted three bidders, was the victory of the consortium of SkyToll (the existing contractor) and CzechToll. According to Dálniční společnost, the Slovak toll should therefore remain in the hands of the same operators as it has been since 2012.
While the terms of the new toll tender were supposed to reduce the share of the toll pie that the private contractor will swallow, the unusually generous remuneration remained. The disadvantage is not to be found only in comparison with the model states. For example, Czech toll collection, which is also criticised, is cheaper and more profitable for the state than in Slovakia. Moreover, the Czech state has also contracted for added services such as toll control. The Slovaks did not even get control for the second time in the winning package.
In addition, the winning consortium offered one third of the project amount compared to what the highway company had expected. The highway authority therefore either overestimated the expected value or the consortium offered an unrealistic price. Both SkyToll and CzechToll belong to a network of companies linked to the PPF group. However, according to the contracts, most of the toll work is carried out by another company, TollNet, which receives almost 80 per cent of all revenues. The company is again owned in a non-transparent way, but its documentation bears the same names – such as notaries – as SkyToll.
The entire Tender 2 is surrounded by unknown addenda and ambiguous contractual wording. This is not the only reason why control authorities and anti-corruption organisations opposed the signing of the contract with the new winner. While Heger’s and later the bureaucratic government responded to their pressure by delaying the signing of the contract with the winners of the tender, at the time of writing the History of Corruption it is unknown how the Fico government number 4 will approach the project. The latter has made no secret of its intentions to weaken the controlling authorities that criticised the contract, and has also attacked the NGO sector.
